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Mark Anderson
MELVILLE AND NIETZSCHE: 
LIVING THE DEATH OF GOD
Abstract. Herman Melville was so estranged from the religious beliefs of 
his time and place that his faith was doubted during his own lifetime. In 
the middle of the twentieth century some scholars even associated him 
with nihilism. To date, however, no one has offered a detailed account 
of Melville in relation to Nietzsche, who first made nihilism a topic of 
serious concern to the Western philosophical tradition. In this essay, I 
discuss some of the hitherto unexplored similarities between Melville’s 
ideas and Nietzsche’s reflections on and reactions to the death of God 
and the advent of nihilism in the West. 
Scholars long ago exposed the black vein of nihilism that runs through Herman Melville’s life and thought. But the majority of 
those who have endeavored to track its course have lacked the philo-
sophical background prerequisite to a thorough exploration, and their 
works are now many years old.1 The most notable exception is All Things 
Shining, the recent effort of two professors of philosophy.2 Unfortunately, 
however, as I have previously argued in these pages, the authors of this 
book are less interested in the reality of Melville than in constructing 
of him an image to turn to their own particular purposes.3 In this essay 
I propose to lay out in some detail the surprising similarities between 
Melville’s ideas and Friedrich Nietzsche’s account of the death of God 
and the nihilism that threatens as a consequence of His passing. There 
is more to be said on this subject than can be treated conveniently in 
a single essay, but I shall make every effort to provide here a generous 
supply of the relevant information.4
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In the summer of 1876, Melville published Clarel, a book-length poem 
in four parts, of approximately eighteen thousand lines, that narrates the 
journey of a young divinity student (Clarel) through the Holy Land in 
the company of a shifting variety of religious, irreligious, and philosophi-
cally inclined travelers. The substance of the poem reflects Melville’s 
lifelong psychological-spiritual-philosophical journey. The setting of the 
poem was inspired by his physical journey from Jerusalem to the Dead 
Sea and back twenty years earlier, during which time he also visited Italy, 
Greece, and Egypt. Melville kept a journal during his Mediterranean 
travels, and his entries give voice throughout to a nihilistic worldview, 
a gloomy and equivocal view that resurfaces in Clarel. 
In the winter of the year that Melville’s poem appeared, Friedrich 
Nietzsche spent several months in Sorrento, Italy, at the invitation of 
his friend Malwida von Meysenbug. Ensconced in the Villa Rubinacci, 
Nietzsche and his fellow houseguests spent their days in walks and 
conversations, and their evenings writing. During this time Nietzsche 
experienced a growing estrangement from the metaphysical idealism 
of Schopenhauer, as he had expressed it in, for example, The Birth of 
Tragedy, and under the influence of his rationalist friend Paul Rée he 
began to develop the positivist mode of thought that characterizes his 
so-called “middle period.” His intellectual activities in Italy would lead 
to his book Human, All Too Human, which, he later informs us, “was writ-
ten in the main in Sorrento.”5 This book, if not itself an account of the 
death of God, certainly marks the beginning of Nietzsche’s movement 
in that direction. See, for example, his description of the work in Ecce 
Homo as a “monument of rigorous self-discipline with which I put a sud-
den end to all my infections with ‘higher swindle,’ ‘idealism,’ ‘beautiful 
feelings,’ and other effeminacies” (BWN, p. 744). He also makes a point 
of associating the book with his later ideas and philosophical projects, 
in particular his assault on metaphysics and his revaluation of values, 
both of which are directly related to his insights into the death of God 
and the advent of nihilism (BWN, p. 745). 
In order to provide the relevant philosophical background in which 
to consider Melville in relation to Nietzsche’s ideas, I offer the follow-
ing general account of Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism, which we 
may divide into two parts or phases.6 The first manifestation of nihil-
ism, which we may call “metaphysical nihilism,” amounts in brief to the 
rejection of belief in any metaphysical reality or truth (which is really 
what the death of God amounts to); the second, which we may refer to 
as “psychological nihilism,” is the condition of despair or depression 
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resulting from the assumption that without metaphysical truth the world 
is valueless and life is not worth living. 
Nietzsche approves of the first type of nihilism, metaphysical nihil-
ism, and we may, I believe, fairly label him a nihilist in this sense of the 
word. Of the second type of nihilism, psychological nihilism, Nietzsche 
vehemently disapproves, and he struggled to resist it himself. When 
he claims in a late note that he had been “the first perfect nihilist of 
Europe,” but that he has “lived through the whole” of it, “leaving it 
behind, outside himself,”7 I read him as claiming to have lived through 
and left behind psychological nihilism. It mustn’t have been easy, for 
even Zarathustra comes perilously close to succumbing to nihilism in its 
guise as nausea at the eternal recurrence of small and despicable men.8 
Nietzsche’s desire, often expressed, to be a Yes-sayer (Ja-sager) involves 
his striving to affirm every aspect and element of the world rather than 
nihilistically to deny or disparage anything or anyone. It is, as I say, a 
struggle, which is why Nietzsche must remind himself repeatedly that 
this is what he is after. 
Anyone who has thought his way into metaphysical nihilism will find 
it difficult to avoid psychological nihilism. In fact, if one fails to consider 
the matter carefully, metaphysical nihilism may actually induce psychologi-
cal nihilism. Nietzsche discusses this phenomenon in a note on nihilism 
“as a psychological state” written around the same time as the note from 
which I have quoted just above (WP §12). Here, Nietzsche explains that 
a man descends into psychological nihilism by having and then losing 
faith in the “aim,” “unity,” and “truth” of the universe. That the universe 
has no aim means that it has no objective telos, no goal to which it is 
heading through an inherent motive force, either its own natural force 
or a force infused by a deity. In short, universal movement and change 
do not track any particular course; events just happen, Becoming just 
is, all things flow without purpose, plan, or teleological directionality. 
That the universe has no unity means that we are not part of any greater 
organizing whole, nor are we modes of the deity, emanations of the One, 
or the articulate productions of a heavenly creator. We do not stand in 
the context of or exist in relation to any superior structure or system; 
we do not fit into an overarching rational whole, like pieces of a puzzle 
safe in their proper position. That the universe lacks truth means in this 
instance that there is no “true world,” no realm of Being, in which the 
aim and unity absent from the eternally cycling current of Becoming 
may reside. Some may chase the dream of a transcendent realm of pure 
Being as a defensive reaction to losing their faith in the aim and unity of 
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this world, hoping to discover beyond the barren void a fullness in some 
other state of existence, a state attainable either now through meditation 
or prayer, for example, or after death for those who merit the reward. 
But when these dreamers realize that they have fabricated this ideal 
of Being from weakness and the fear of the reality of Becoming—that 
is, if they realize this; some, perhaps most, will not—then through this 
realization they will have rejected the imaginary “true world” and will, 
thereby, have taken the final step into nihilism as a psychological state, 
which is to say, into the depressive condition of psychological nihilism. 
This, as I have noted, is the view that the world is valueless, the world 
as taken to include oneself, which by implication must be regarded as 
valueless too. One had thought of oneself as having value precisely through 
the aim, unity, and truth of the world of which one is a part, but now 
that one no longer believes in these categories, one finds no source of 
value at all. To quote Nietzsche on this: “The categories ‘aim,’ ‘unity,’ 
‘being’ which we used to project some value into the world—we pull 
out again; so the world looks valueless” (WP §12). 
I have referred to “losing faith” in these three categories, but the 
descent into nihilism actually requires that one lose faith in one aspect 
of their application only, while continuing to accept another. One must 
cease to believe that the categories apply to reality—which is to say that 
one must be a metaphysical nihilist—but one must retain one’s belief that 
they are the sources (the only possible sources) of the value of existence. 
Without this latter belief as to the source of value, the rejection of one’s 
former belief in metaphysics will not generate the conclusion that the 
world is valueless—it will not lead to psychological nihilism. Nietzsche 
stresses this himself, remarking that “nihilism as a psychological state” 
may be overcome, or avoided altogether, by rejecting the metaphysics of 
these categories and also their supposed existential import. In his own 
words, we must “give up our faith in [these categories],” for “once we 
have devaluated [them], the demonstration that they cannot be applied 
to the universe is no longer any reason for devaluating the universe” 
(WP §12). In short, we must lose faith not only in the reality of these 
categories but also in their role as guarantors of value: in this way, we 
shall be metaphysical nihilists without succumbing also to psychological 
nihilism. The distinction is important, for Nietzsche regards metaphysi-
cal nihilism as potentially liberating, as providing for the healthy and 
powerful man an opportunity for a Dionysian affirmation of life, whereas 
he regards psychological nihilism as the deplorable condition of the 
life-denying weak and timid man. For the right type of man, then, for 
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the sort of man Nietzsche admires and strives to be himself, metaphysi-
cal nihilism is a cheerful, emancipating event. If God never really was 
the source of meaning and value, then His passing undermines noth-
ing. And although His death may distress those too feeble to stand on 
their own, the higher types will celebrate their radical independence 
and with Nietzsche strive to be Yes-sayers. For such men, the nihilistic 
consequences of God’s demise are “like a new and scarcely describable 
kind of light, happiness, relief, exhilaration, encouragement, dawn.”9 
I turn now to Melville’s recognition of the death of God and his own 
struggles with nihilism, and I approach the subject through the door of 
epistemology. But before I address the long bleak period of Melville’s 
life and thought, a period that includes both his Mediterranean travels 
and his composition of Clarel, I should provide some account of Moby-
Dick, for in addition to demonstrating that Melville shared, and in fact 
anticipated, Nietzsche’s recognition of the death of God and the onset 
of nihilism in the West, I intend to display their different personal reac-
tions to these phenomena. We shall see not only that Melville in his 
Moby-Dick period effortlessly achieved a state of “happiness . . . exhilara-
tion . . .  dawn” as a result of God’s demise, a state, in short, of jubilant 
affirmation, which Nietzsche himself had constantly to strive to match, 
but also that Melville could not sustain this condition and eventually 
sank more deeply into psychological nihilism than Nietzsche ever did. 
In a late chapter of Moby-Dick entitled “The Gilder,” Ishmael observes, 
“There is no steady unretracing progress in this life; we do not advance 
through fixed gradations, and at the last one pause:—through infancy’s 
unconscious spell, boyhood’s thoughtless faith, adolescence’s doubt (the 
common doom), then scepticism, then disbelief, resting at last in man-
hood’s pondering repose of If. But once gone through, we trace the 
round again; and are infants, boys, and men, and Ifs eternally.”10 This is 
not Nietzsche’s eternal return of course, meaninglessness repeated ad 
infinitum, which Nietzsche often employs as an image of nihilism. But 
it is an expression of goallessness, of an antiteleological view of human 
life. And here is another: 
Were this world an endless plain, and by sailing eastward we could for 
ever reach new distances, and discover sights more sweet and strange than 
any Cyclades or Islands of King Solomon, then there was promise in the 
voyage. But in pursuit of those far mysteries we dream of, or in tormented 
chase of that demon phantom that, sometime or other, swims before all 
human hearts; while chasing such over this round globe, they either lead 
us on in barren mazes or midway leave us whelmed. (MD, p. 237) 
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But quite apart from the fiction of Moby-Dick, Melville expressed these 
same ideas in his own voice, as, for example, when during this period 
(April 1851) he wrote to Nathaniel Hawthorne, “We incline to think 
that God cannot explain His own secrets, and that He would like a little 
information upon certain points Himself.”11
If there is no end to our pursuit, no answers to the questions we put 
to the universe, no essences as objects of knowledge, then there is no 
God, certainly no god as conceived either by Plato or by traditional 
Christianity, God as the source and ground of reality and objective truth. 
And the deep ontological relativism, or (to employ a Nietzschean term) 
perspectivism, that must be the result of this appears, for example, in 
the chapter of Moby-Dick entitled “The Doubloon.” In a previous chapter 
(“The Quarter-Deck”), Ahab nailed a doubloon to the mainmast as a 
reward for the first man to spy the great white whale. In “The Doubloon,” 
various men inspecting the coin impose a variety of interpretations on 
the images inscribed on its face. The second mate, Stubb, overhearing 
these many interpretations, eventually remarks, “There’s another ren-
dering now; but still one text. All sorts of men in one kind of world, 
you see” (MD, p. 434). But Stubb does not penetrate as deeply into the 
problem as does Ishmael, who earlier in this same chapter reflects that 
“some certain significance lurks in all things, else all things are little 
worth, and the round world itself but an empty cipher” (MD, p. 430). 
Stubb observes epistemological relativism: different interpretations but 
still one text, “one kind of world.” But Ishmael ponders ontological 
relativism: the relativism resulting from a fundamental lack of essences 
and objective meaning, the possibility that (and here I employ another 
Nietzschean formulation) there are no facts, only interpretations. Or, 
to express the idea in Melville’s own voice, by citing the same letter to 
Hawthorne from which I have quoted above: “And perhaps, after all, 
there is no secret. We incline to think that the Problem of the Universe 
is like the Freemason’s mighty secret, so terrible to all children. It turns 
out, at last, to consist in a triangle, a mallet, and an apron—nothing 
more!” (C, p. 186). Melville understands that this sort of universe—or, 
to return to Moby-Dick—this sort of world, a world that is not at bottom 
“one kind of world,” would be “an empty cipher,” which is to say, he 
understands that metaphysical nihilism follows upon the death of God. 
Although Melville appears at times to stress the value of truth in a 
manner that Nietzsche would not countenance, a careful inspection 
of his use of the word tends to minimize the difference. In a letter 
from his Moby-Dick period in which he praises Hawthorne’s “intense 
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feeling of the visable truth,” Melville explains that he has in mind “the 
apprehension of the absolute condition of present things as they strike 
the eye of the man who fears them not, though they do their worst to 
him” (C, p. 186). And in Moby-Dick itself he writes that “in landlessness 
alone lies the highest truth, shoreless, indefinite as God,” providing 
further insight into his meaning by adding, “so better is it to perish in 
that howling infinite, than be ingloriously dashed upon the lee, even 
if that were safety!” (MD, p. 107). So “truth” for Melville has less to do 
with an adaequatio intellectus ad rem than with the fearless expression of 
“the tragicalness of human thought in its own unbiased, native, and 
profounder workings” (C, p. 186). Properly understood, then, even 
Melville’s references to “truth” ring with a Nietzschean tone. To seek 
or state the truth is not to strive for correspondence or reference but 
rather to look into the abyss without fear of the abyss glaring back.
Melville seems to have learned these things, or to have been set on his 
way to learning them, as a young sailor at sea encountering a plurality 
of exotic worldviews and developing a facility for inhabiting multiple 
perspectives. He saw through Christianity while seeing into native pagan-
ism in person, through the direct experience of roaming around the 
Pacific islands. In his early twenties, at an age when Nietzsche was but 
a schoolboy, a studious scholar in training reading ancient history and 
philosophy books in his cramped apartment by candlelight, Melville was 
working aboard a whaling ship; brazenly deserting his post, trekking 
into the wilds of a jungle, and winding up captive to a warrior tribe 
of cannibals; bathing with a pagan beauty in the pristine interior of a 
Polynesian isle; escaping from cannibals; signing on to another ship 
only to join a mutiny and spend some days imprisoned in a Tahitian 
calaboose; escaping confinement by moonlight and making for Eimeo 
(known today as Moorea); working and wandering around the island 
for kicks; recklessly attempting to meet a Polynesian queen; and finally, 
joining the American navy just to hitch a ride home. His wild adventures 
at sea stretched on for four years. 
We often say that Nietzsche was one of the few philosophers who 
really lived his ideas. This is true in some sense, but not at all in every 
sense: for how did Nietzsche live? For ten years he lived in a university 
town (Basel) as a professional pedagogue. After his early retirement 
he traveled through Europe by train and carriage from one hotel or 
rented room to another; roamed the streets and haunted the cafés of 
each town he visited, alone; jotted down his thoughts and wrote his 
books. Melville, on the other hand, lived indeed—in his youth anyway 
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he was an irrepressible wanderer, gathering experience through the 
sort of free-spirited exploits that a boyish academic like young Fritz 
could only read about in storybooks. Unlike Nietzsche, Melville had to 
do without the classical education he so craved. But as a compensation 
he dove headfirst into the realities Nietzsche was denied. In Ecce Homo 
Nietzsche admits, and laments, the bookishness of his upbringing and 
education, his lack of practical, physical training. As a result of “our 
German education—its ‘idealism,’” he complains, he was as a youth 
“backward to the point of holiness.” The problem is that the sort of 
“classical education” he received “teaches one from the start to ignore 
realities and to pursue so-called ‘ideal goals’” (BWN, p. 693), precisely 
the variety of goal he spent most of his philosophical life railing against. 
In any case, however Melville stands in relation to Nietzsche with 
respect to these things, he had experience of the world well beyond 
the confines of nineteenth-century New England provincialism, beyond 
the boundaries in particular of established Christianity. The heathens 
he encountered were no depraved devils (cannibals though some of 
them may have been!). In fact, to Melville’s mind they compared quite 
favorably to the ignorant and often brutal missionaries sent out from 
the States to convert and save their poor pagan souls. Melville himself 
made this clear in his works, and for this he was censured by a variety 
of pious critics, including a few of his literary friends less intellectually 
daring than himself. In short, Melville was a “free spirit” among the 
hidebound New England faithful. 
Melville’s worldliness enabled him to be the thinker and artist that 
he was, but shuffling through multiple perspectives like this can—and 
in Melville’s case most likely eventually did—result also in nihilism, as 
in Nietzsche’s note that “there are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx 
has eyes—and consequently there are many kinds of ‘truths,’ and con-
sequently there is no truth” (WP §540). Perhaps something like this, 
the potentially deflating consequences of this, combined with profes-
sional failures and familial hardships, finally brought Melville down 
into Nietzsche’s “nihilism as a psychological state,” or what I have called 
psychological nihilism. 
Melville’s disenchantment with the world is evident in the journals 
he kept during his Mediterranean travels, and in the book, Clarel, that 
these travels inspired. Formerly a bright young romantic, Melville on the 
Mediterranean is a gloomy realist. He cannot project the great archaic 
myths and legends onto the modern landscapes he encounters, and he 
suffers from this incapacity. Delos, for example, the birthplace of Apollo 
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and site of the ancient Ionian festivals, once so “flowery in fable,” now 
presents “a most barren aspect.”12 Patmos, too, is equally barren; and 
when, later, Melville looked upon this island’s “arid height,” his “spirit 
partook of the bareness” (J, p. 97). In Clarel Melville employs this same 
vocabulary, but he applies it to something far vaster and, one might 
think, much more inherently significant than a Greek island. Upon the 
death of his beloved, Clarel cries: “O blind, blind, barren universe!”13 A 
barren universe is a godless universe, and whether the divine exists or 
not, the fact that faith in its presence has waned in the modern world 
is brought out in Clarel through a rhyme recited by the character Rolfe, 
which as well as any line in the poem expresses the death of God: 
Flamen, flamen, put away
Robe and miter glorious:
Doubt undeifies the day!
Look, in vapors odorous
As the spice-king’s funeral-pyre, 
Dies the Zoroastrian fire
On your altars in decay:
The rule, the Magian rule is run,
And Mythra abdicates the sun! (CL 4.16.208–16) 
Earlier in the poem the character Mortmain makes a similar point 
when he scrawls on a rock a verse headed “by one who wails the loss” 
(CL 2.31.43). The short poem is a lamentation of the death of God by 
way of a reflection on the constellation of the Southern Cross. It reads 
in full as follows:
Emblazoned bleak in austral skies—
A heaven remote, whose starry swarm
Like Science lights but cannot warm— 
Translated Cross, hast thou withdrawn,
Dim paling too at every dawn,
With symbols vain once counted wise,
And gods declined to heraldries?
Estranged, estranged: can friend prove so? 
Aloft, aloof, a frigid sign:
How far removed, thou Tree divine,
Whose tender fruit did reach so low—
Love apples of New-Paradise!
About the wide Australian sea
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The planted nations yet to be
When, ages hence, they lift their eyes,
Tell, what shall they retain of thee?
But class thee with Orion’s sword?
In constellations unadored,
Christ and the Giant equal prize?
The atheist cycles—must they be?
Fomentors as forefathers we? (CL 2.31.50–70)
Have the gods declined to heraldries, mere heraldries? The fear is that 
the cross, and all it represents—God foremost—has become a vacuous 
symbol, a signifier with nothing to signify. 
Perhaps the starkest personal (as opposed to literary) statement of 
Melville’s intellectual distance from the faith of his fathers is this, written 
as he sailed past Cyprus: “From these waters rose Venus from the foam. 
Found it as hard to realize such a thing as to realize on Mt Olivet that 
from there Christ rose” (J, p. 95). 
Was Melville, then, an atheist or anti-Christian? It is hard to say. 
Probably he could not have said himself. Or, like many thoughtful indi-
viduals, he would have provided different answers at different times, or 
mutely refrained from answering altogether. But my point is less about 
Melville’s personal beliefs than about his insight into the spiritual con-
dition of the West in his day. He understood that God is dead, and the 
only reason he did not formulate the fact in precisely these terms is 
that his literary proclivities ran more toward the labyrinthine than the 
aphoristic. His prose style, vocabulary, and conceptual inventory were 
influenced and informed more by Shakespeare, Milton, and Thomas 
Browne than by Plato, Kant, and Schopenhauer.14 
No man for whom the Christian God is alive and well could have 
written Clarel, as no man who devoutly believed in a god under any 
conception could have written Moby-Dick. Clarel is something like a very 
long Platonic dialogue, in verse, with a multiplicity of interlocutors 
addressing or being overheard by a young student of theology. The 
very characters and context prepare the ground for a relentless inter-
rogation of God’s existence and the purpose and significance of human 
life, and the content is unrelenting indeed. Every perspective, including 
the most thoroughly atheistic, is given a hearing, and as to the effect of 
the whole, one could do no better in describing it than to paraphrase 
Melville’s own formula from Moby-Dick and say that it leads one round 
the course of unconscious spell, thoughtless faith, doubt, skepticism, 
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and disbelief, with a pondering pause at If before beginning the cycle 
again, and then again, eternally.
As we have seen, Melville knew well before his Mediterranean tour 
that the world is disenchanted, in the sense, that is, of lacking any 
indication of objective meaning, truth, or value as traditionally under-
stood by the Platonist philosopher or the Christian theologian. During 
the period he wrote Moby-Dick, Melville was no simple believer. He did 
not, however, suffer from the absence of any God or gods; he did not 
regard the universal void as a “barrenness.” In those days, Melville was 
“young and healthy,”15 physiologically robust in a Nietzschean sense. At 
age thirty-one he made the famous trip to Monument Mountain with a 
group of friends and associates, during which excursion he first made 
the acquaintance of Hawthorne. While on this ramble, Melville leapt 
without a care onto a rock that projected out beyond the cliffs, a feat 
that made others in the party nervous and queasy. On another occa-
sion, he scurried up a tall tree, sat on a precarious branch, and called 
out to the approaching members of his party. He notoriously drove his 
wagon with wild abandon, and he regularly tramped out for walks and 
hikes of miles. Melville in his early thirties was, in short, full of vigor 
and overflowing with instinctive power. Indeed, despite the high pitch 
to which his intellect had by this time developed, Melville’s conscious 
mind did not inhibit the workings of his unconscious vitality. J. E. A. 
Smith’s recollection that Melville in the Berkshires often “threw off 
thoughts suggested by the locality or the incidents of the day, although 
he seemed as unconscious of any effort as of his breathing or the beat-
ing of his heart. It was involuntary” reminds one for all the world of 
Nietzsche’s reflections on the superiority of free-flowing unconscious 
activity, as in his remark that “artists . . . [know] only too well that pre-
cisely when they no longer do anything ‘voluntarily’ but do everything 
of necessity, their feeling of freedom, subtlety, full power, of creative 
placing, disposing, and forming reaches its peak.”16 Here we have an 
apt description of Melville at this time, a powerful artist who was (to 
return to Smith’s account) “full of jovial life and enthusiasm . . . ; one 
whose like is rarely found.”
All this is to say that whatever the state of the world, as himself when 
writing Moby-Dick, and through Ishmael the character he created, 
Melville confronted the world as a Nietzschean Ja-sager. He transcended 
the intellectual’s facile dichotomy of belief and unbelief, rose above 
even the philosopher’s “pondering repose of If,” and understood that 
one must always “trace the round again . . . eternally.” Because of this 
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understanding, together with his affirmative cheerfulness in the face 
of it, we might say that Melville possessed a joyful wisdom and call 
him downright Zarathustran. Through his Ishmael, Melville revels in 
exploring the deepest matters, which inevitably prompt unanswerable 
questions. The uncertainty does not unsettle him; rather, it thrills him, 
spins him up, and spurs him on. From the opening chapter of Moby-Dick 
we encounter a mind that delights in exploring the labyrinths of life’s 
great imponderables: 
Why did the old Persians hold the sea holy? Why did the Greeks give it a 
separate deity, and make him the own brother of Jove? Surely all this is not 
without meaning. And still deeper the meaning of that story of Narcissus, 
who because he could not grasp the tormenting, mild image he saw in 
the fountain, plunged into it and was drowned. But that same image, we 
ourselves see in all rivers and oceans. It is the image of the ungraspable 
phantom of life; and this is the key to it all. (MD, p. 5)
Moby-Dick is, among many other things, Melville’s record of swimming 
in pursuit of this phantom without drowning. 
Melville during his Moby-Dick period experienced such a sustained 
mood of liberated and self-sufficing exultation that he could insist on 
and celebrate not only the greatness of his achievement but also its 
antinomianism, immoralism, even “wickedness,” in terms that prefigure 
in an extraordinary way Nietzsche’s own most boldly expressed self-
assessments. When Nietzsche refers to Beyond Good and Evil as a “frightful” 
book that flowed from his soul “very black, almost [as from a] squid,”17 
one cannot help but recall Melville’s comparison of Moby-Dick to whale 
blubber that must be cooked up to get oil out of it (C, p. 162), and his 
warning to his friend Sarah Morewood not to read the book because 
it “is of the horrible texture of a fabric that should be woven of ships’ 
cables & hawsers. A Polar wind blows through it, & birds of prey hover 
over it.” And when he advises Morewood in this same letter to “warn all 
gentle fastidious people from so much as peeping into the book” (C, p. 
206), one thinks of Nietzsche’s remark to his friend Meta von Salis that 
one must read Beyond Good and Evil “with clinched teeth.”18 
Nietzsche concludes Beyond Good and Evil by describing the contents 
of the book as the “sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude . . . my 
old beloved—wicked thoughts” (BGE §296). It is hard to resist setting 
beside this Melville’s remark in a letter to Hawthorne that “I have written 
a wicked book, and feel spotless as the lamb” (C, p. 212; my italics). One 
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thinks as well of Melville’s referring in a previous letter (C, p. 196) to “the 
hell-fire in which the whole book is broiled” and to “the book’s motto 
(the secret one),—Ego non baptiso te in nomine,” the rest of which 
formula he advised Hawthorne to make out himself: it is, in fact, the 
beginning of a passage that Melville had read in an essay on witchcraft 
entitled “Superstition and Knowledge” (from 1823, by Francis Palgrave, 
but published anonymously) that runs “Ego non baptizo te in nomine 
Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti—sed in nomine Diaboli” (my italics).
Nietzsche had previously written, in a book to which Beyond Good and 
Evil was originally intended as a sequel and expansion, “We investigators 
are, like all conquerors, discoverers, seafarers, adventurers, of an auda-
cious morality and must reconcile ourselves to being considered on the 
whole evil.”19 Melville, of course, was the authentic seafaring adventurer 
here, and as for being considered evil, and quite apart from the rebukes 
he received in the press for his ironical-critical treatment of Christianity, 
and the animosity of his Pittsfield neighbors who resented his refusal to 
attend church, he himself once claimed to have summoned Moby-Dick 
with an “evil art” (C, p. 209).
Melville could, like Nietzsche much later, affirm his free-spirited 
accomplishment because of his übermenschlich state of well-being. When 
in Moby-Dick he depicts Ishmael as depressed when he goes to sea (as 
in “Loomings”) but as improving while watching Queequeg conduct 
his pagan rites, and then even turning pagan himself (in “A Bosom 
Friend”), Melville alludes to his own ability to occupy and affirm vari-
ous perspectives in the wake of the death of God. “I felt a melting in 
me,” his Ishmael says. “No more my splintered heart and maddened 
hand were turned against the wolfish world. This soothing savage had 
redeemed it” (MD, p. 51). 
As further evidence of Melville’s psychological-spiritual condition, 
consider his account of the “free and easy sort of genial, desperado 
philosophy” that enables his Ishmael, even “in some time of extreme 
tribulation” and “in the very midst of his earnestness”—as, for example, 
when confronting death in a little harpoon boat attacked by a whale—to 
consider the whole affair a good-natured joke. Indeed, for this variety of 
philosopher, in the whole of life “nothing dispirits, and nothing seems 
worth while disputing. He bolts down all events, all creeds, and beliefs, 
and persuasions, all hard things visible and invisible, never mind how 
knobby,” and looks on the world “tranquilly and contentedly” (MD, p. 
226). Finally, consider the following expression of affirmation that fol-
lows from the gaya scienza of Melville’s desperado philosophy: 
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But even so, amid the tornadoed Atlantic of my being, do I myself still 
for ever centrally disport in mute calm; and while ponderous planets of 
unwaning woe revolve around me, deep down and deep inland there I 
still bathe me in eternal mildness of joy. (MD, p. 389)
Nietzsche likely never fully attained so complete an affirmation of 
a godless world in his own person, and as sickly as he was throughout 
his life, he most definitely did not attain the Zarathustran state physi-
cally, as Melville did during his Moby-Dick period. But this Melville, this 
Massachusetts Zarathustra, did not live long. By his mid-thirties, after 
the decline of his literary fortunes, and as his Mediterranean journals 
attest, Melville fell into a quiet despair that in later years at best resolved 
into a mellow Schopenhauerian resignation. When he visited Hawthorne 
on his way to the Holy Land, the latter lamented in his diary what he 
regarded as the deleterious consequences of his old friend’s deep-diving, 
inquisitive mind, noting that Melville “persists—and has persisted ever 
since I knew him, and probably long before—in wandering to-and-fro” 
in thought and speculation concerning “Providence and futurity, and 
of everything that lies beyond human ken.” To this characteristic of 
Melville’s way of being Hawthorne seems to have attributed the fact 
that his friend had “pretty much made up his mind to be annihilated” 
(J, p. 628). 
Hawthorne described Melville at this meeting as looking like his old 
self but “perhaps a little sadder,” and he opined that his friend’s works, 
“for a long while past, have indicated a morbid state of mind” (J, p. 628). 
In short, Hawthorne observed Melville’s decline in person. The “onto-
logical heroics” that Melville, while writing Moby-Dick, looked forward 
to engaging in with Hawthorne over a drink were no longer sport for 
Ishmaelean exuberance. Melville now was weary, enervated. Looking 
about him on his Mediterranean tour, all Melville can see is “the decayed 
picturesque” and “life after enthusiasm is gone” (J, pp. 71–72). This last 
phrase is telling, for although he applied it to the Greek islands, we may 
take it as indicative of the nihilistic perspective through which he con-
templated them. And what is worse than this unbelief, Melville can no 
longer muster the old affirmation, the celebration of uncertainty, even 
of blank disbelief, of which he was so vibrantly capable in a healthier 
phase of life, a phase only recently passed chronologically but an eon 
gone as marked by the measure of his psychology. 
No longer naive, in Schiller’s sense of this term, Melville on his 
Mediterranean tour could not even attain to Schiller’s sentimental 
73Mark Anderson 
perspective. He was “afflicted,” as he put it, “with the great curse of 
modern travel—skepticism” (J, p. 97). For this he condemned the mod-
erns, the Germans in particular, with their all-pulverizing enlightenment 
Wissenschaft: “Heartily wish Niebuhr and Strauss to the dogs,” he writes, 
“the deuce take their penetration & acumen. They have robbed us of the 
bloom. If they have undeceived anyone—no thanks to them” (J, p. 97). 
In Clarel he put the matter thus (through the character of Rolfe): “All 
now’s revised: / Zion, like Rome is Niebuhrized. / Yes, doubt attends” 
(CL 1.34.18–20). 
Nietzsche seems never to have gone through an extended period of 
psychological nihilism similar to Melville’s post-Moby-Dick phase. For a 
time, of course, in his early period he was a Schopenhauerian pessimist, 
but only theoretically, and perhaps for only a very short time, though 
looking back in Ecce Homo he does castigate himself for “very earnestly 
deny[ing] my ‘will to life’ at the time when I first read Schopenhauer 
(1865)” (BWN, p. 693). But at worst Nietzsche suffered from disgust at 
the modern world and modern man, and sadness over certain personal 
disappointments (poor health, lack of readers, isolation, and loneli-
ness). To this extent, at least, we might say that he succumbed to a 
form of psychological nihilism, even after the affirmation of Zarathustra. 
In fact, there is reason to believe that he judged himself incapable of 
reaching the heights of affirmation to which his Zarathustra could so 
effortlessly ascend, and that he created Zarathustra precisely to accom-
plish in writing what he could not accomplish himself through living.20 
Still, the dissimilarity to Melville is evident. Melville’s was a deep and 
abiding malaise, which perhaps in the end he transformed into a mild, 
content resignation but did not overcome into anything approaching 
Dionysian affirmation. 
Yet despite Melville’s inability to live at peace with his philosophical 
insight into the godlessness of this world, we should give him his due for 
having had this insight and for pursuing its consequences so uncompro-
misingly. Nietzsche’s first statement of the death of God comes in 1882, 
but Melville announced His demise, if only indirectly, as early as 1851 in 
Moby-Dick. Melville, then, anticipated Nietzsche by a full thirty years, and it 
is worth remarking that he did so in an environment much less primed 
to engender the idea, and much more hostile to it, than the academic 
and philosophical circles of late-nineteenth-century Western Europe. It 
is also remarkable that, apart from Melville’s historical precedence, he 
also anticipated Nietzsche in terms of biographical chronology, realizing 
and exploring by age thirty what Nietzsche comes to see at thirty-six. 
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Quite apart from the tangle of problems that such questions of pre-
cedence might raise, however, I think we may without fear of cavil apply 
to Melville and Nietzsche both the following resonant, and in its way 
terrifying, line from Clarel:
Alone, and at Doubt’s freezing pole
He wrestled with the pristine forms
Like the first man. (CL 1.17.194–96) 
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